U.S. signs 30-year civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia, opening door to domestic enrichment

The Trump administration signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement - known as a 123 Agreement - with Saudi Arabia on 22 July 2026, transmitting it to Congress for a mandatory review period^[1]. The deal is structured to run approximately 30 years and would allow American companies to provide nuclear technology, materials, and expertise to the kingdom^[1][2].

What the agreement covers

The deal consists of an accord under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 alongside an accompanying bilateral safeguards agreement. Under the framework, a combined U.S.-Saudi team would first evaluate whether uranium enrichment in the kingdom is commercially feasible and necessary; should the project advance, American companies would construct any enrichment facility while maintaining authority over sensitive technology.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the agreement contains a provision that could allow for a "black box" uranium enrichment facility located in the kingdom but run by U.S. companies - though the need for such a facility would be determined after a two-year study. Saudi Arabia would be barred from independently developing enrichment technology or obtaining it from other nations for the first ten years of the agreement^[1].

The primary commercial beneficiary is Westinghouse. The roughly 30-year deal for the construction of AP1000 reactors, worth tens of billions of dollars, would benefit Westinghouse, jointly owned by Canada-based Cameco and Brookfield Asset Management. The agreement would also allow Bechtel, BWXT, Centrus, and other companies to sell sensitive nuclear equipment to Saudi Arabia.^[3]

The safeguards gap

A central concern among nonproliferation experts is that the deal does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol - the standard benchmark for enhanced nuclear inspections. The pact does not mandate that Saudi Arabia accept the IAEA's Additional Protocol; instead, it establishes a bilateral safeguards arrangement that U.S. officials say is intended to address Saudi concerns while preserving oversight.

A provision of current law restricts the executive branch from submitting the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement required for congressional review of 123 agreements for countries - like Saudi Arabia - that have not agreed to certain international safeguards. The administration waived that restriction, stating that the draft agreement would be implemented with a Bilateral Safeguards Agreement that, "with the involvement" of the IAEA, would employ additional safeguards and verification measures in the most proliferation-sensitive areas.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said the kingdom does not want a nuclear weapon, but has also said it will pursue one if Iran develops a nuclear weapon. Several Democratic lawmakers warned that the arrangement could trigger a regional arms race^[2].

The Israel condition

The day after the agreement was announced, President Trump said the deal requires the kingdom to normalize relations with Israel - a significant condition not previously mentioned when the deal was announced. Trump wrote on Truth Social that the deal "pertains only to non-military use" and "will be approved, but is totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the very respected and successful Abraham Accords."^[2]

At issue is a late-breaking demand from the U.S. that Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords as a step to normalize relations with Israel, though questions remain over safeguards and guarantees to prevent the country from reprocessing nuclear material into weapons. A major sticking point has been Saudi Arabia's support for the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which conditions recognition of Israel on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state - a framework Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has categorically rejected.

What Westinghouse actually stands to win

A Section 123 agreement is an enabling legal framework and does not constitute a reactor award, construction plan, or financing package. Saudi Arabia would still need to select a technology, establish an owner and regulator, determine localization requirements, negotiate engineering, procurement, and construction arrangements, and secure financing.

Westinghouse's position is not guaranteed. Saudi Arabia's energy ministry released a tender for two 1,400 MW pressurized water reactors in which Westinghouse was not invited to bid^[3]. The Wall Street Journal reported in August 2023 that what Saudi Arabia may really want is U.S. nuclear energy management expertise and PWRs from South Korea - the same type of reactors built for the UAE.^[3] Westinghouse's expectation is that the cleared 123 Agreement could give it a pole position to sell 1,150 MW AP1000s and, eventually, its planned AP300 SMR and eVinci transportable microreactor.^[3]

What to watch

Congress has the power to block the deal if both chambers pass disapproval resolutions^[1]. The enrichment question remains genuinely unresolved: the signed text leaves the door open to a future U.S.-operated facility inside the kingdom, while Trump's post-signing Truth Social statement claimed there would be "no enrichment of material" - a direct contradiction that lawmakers and analysts are still parsing^[2][3]. The Abraham Accords condition adds a second variable entirely outside the nuclear file. Whether Saudi Arabia moves toward Israel normalization - and on what timeline - will determine whether this agreement ever translates into poured concrete.